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INDUCED MOODS, WARNING MESSAGES, AND GAMBLING BEHAVIOR
by
LINDSEY BRADLEY
(Under the Direction of Ty W. Boyer)
ABSTRACT

Gambling behavior is maintained by cognitive biases (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002) which
stem from an automatic level of thinking, referred to as System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 thinking is
more deliberative than System 1, but requires more cognitive effort. System 2 is only activated when
necessary. Positive affect increases reliance on System 1, often leading to an increase in risky behavior.
Negative affect increases reliance on System 2, often leading to a decrease in risky behavior. Researchers
argue that mandatory warning messages should be implemented in gambling venues to caution patrons
against the dangers of problem gambling (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Shaffer, 2004; Ginley, Whelan,
Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017; Steenbergh, Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004). Pop-up warning
messages (Monaghan & Blaszczynski, 2010) containing information meant to correct gambling-related
cognitive biases (Ginley et al., 2017) are most effective. The current study sought to bridge a gap between
the literature on gambling warning messages and literature on the effect of affect on risky decisionmaking. If a case is to be made for implementing mandatory gambling warning messages, it is important
to examine if the effectiveness of warning messages is modulated by affect. Participants were randomly
assigned to be induced with either positive or negative affect, and to either receive gambling warning
messages or not receive gambling warning messages. It was hypothesized that those induced with positive
affect would have higher levels of risk-taking than those induced with negative affect. It was also
hypothesized that there would be an interaction effect between affect condition and warning message
condition. Results showed that there was not a significant difference in risk-taking behavior between
those who received warning messages and those who did not receive warning messages. There was a
trend towards a significant difference based on affect condition, in that those induced with negative affect
had slightly higher levels of risk-taking than those induced with positive affect. No significant interaction
effects were detected.
INDEX WORDS: Gambling, Risk-taking, Warning messages, Positive affect, Negative affect, System 1,
System 2.

INDUCED MOODS, WARNING MESSAGES, AND GAMBLING BEHAVIOR
by
LINDSEY BRADLEY
B.S., Georgia Southern University, 2016

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SCIENCE
STATESBORO, GEORGIA

© 2018
LINDSEY BRADLEY
All Rights Reserved

1

INDUCED MOODS, WARNING MESSAGES, AND GAMBLING BEHAVIOR
by
LINDSEY BRADLEY

Major Professor:
Committee:

Electronic Version Approved:
July 2018

Ty W. Boyer
Jeffrey Klibert
Lindsay Larson

2

DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this project to my parents, Clyde and Laura Bradley, who have always
encouraged me to work hard and achieve my goals. Thank you for your love and support!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my thesis committee chair, Dr. Ty Boyer, for his guidance and mentorship
throughout the past two years. His expertise with conducting psychological research was invaluable
during the development and execution of this project.
I would also like to thank Dr. Jeffrey Klibert and Dr. Lindsay Larson for taking the time to serve as
members of my thesis committee. Their feedback and ideas helped shape my project and make my
research stronger.
I am very grateful for each member of my committee and the time and effort they put forth into helping
guide me through this project.

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………………………………
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………………...
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………..
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………...
Gambling and Cognitive Biases…………………………………………………….
Affect………………………………………………………………………………..
Gambling Warning Messages………………………………………………………
Current Study……………………………………………………………………….
2 METHOD………………………………………………………………………………
Participants………………………………………………………………………….
Overview……………………………………………………………………………
Materials…………………………………………………………………………….
Procedure…………………………………………………………………………....
3 RESULTS…………………………………………………………………………........
Affect Manipulation Check…………………………………………………………
Warning Messages and Affect……………………………………………………...
DOSPERT and BART……………………………………………………………...
Age………………………………………………………………………….............
Gender………………………………………………………………………………
Mental Health……………………………………………………………………….
4 DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………………………..
Hypothesis 1………………………………………………………………………...
Hypothesis 2a……………………………………………………………………….
Hypothesis 2b……………………………………………………………………….
PANAS Change Scores……………………………………………………………..
DOSPERT and BART……………………………………………………………...
Gender………………………………………………………………………………
Mental Health……………………………………………………………………….
General Discussion………………………………………………………………….
Limitations and Future Directions………………………………………………….
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………...
APPENDICES
Appendix A………………………………………………………………………....
Appendix B………………………………………………………………………....

3
5
6
7
8
12
16
20
22
22
22
23
25
30
30
31
32
32
32
33
35
35
37
37
38
40
40
41
42
45
50
71
74

5

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1: Demographic Information................................................................................................
Table 2: PANAS Score Information…....…...................................................................................
Table 3: DOSPERT Correlations with Age and the BART............................................................

60
61
62

6

LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1: Flowchart Representing the Study Procedure...................................................................
Figure 2: Visual Representation of the BART Trials…...................................................................
Figure 3: Mean Number of Pumps by Condition……….................................................................
Figure 4: Relationship Between BART Performance and DOSPERT Social Domain....................
Figure 5: Mean Number of Pumps by Gender.................................................................................
Figure 6: DOSPERT Differences by Gender...................................................................................
Figure 7: DOSPERT Differences by Self-Reported Past Mental Health.........................................
Figure 8: DOSPERT Differences by Self-Reported Current Mental Health....................................

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

7

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
People are faced with opportunities to engage in risky behaviors on a daily basis. Risk-taking
behaviors are typically defined as actions that are known to have potentially negative outcomes (Boyer,
2006; Reyna & Farley, 2006). These behaviors encompass a wide variety of actions including, but not
limited to: drinking and driving, substance abuse, unprotected sex, and gambling. The Research Institute
on Addictions (2012) found that over 80 percent of Americans participate in gambling activities every
year. In addition, the 2016 Survey of Problem Gambling Services in the United States stated that 5.45
million Americans reported a problem with gambling in the past year (National Council on Problematic
Gambling, 2016). Problem gambling (i.e., excessive gambling) can lead to difficulties in one’s daily life,
such as complications with relationships, finances, and jobs (Wang, 2016). According to the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 5th Edition (DSM-5), problem gambling can lead to a
diagnosis of gambling disorder, which is currently the only behavioral addiction disorder recognized
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To be diagnosed with a gambling disorder, at least four of the
following symptoms/behaviors must have occurred during the past year: the need to gamble with an
increasing amount of money to achieve a desired level of excitement, feeling restless or irritable when
trying to reduce gambling, repeated unsuccessful efforts to reduce gambling, frequent thoughts about
gambling, gambling when distressed, returning to “get even” (i.e., win back lost money) after losing,
lying to conceal gambling activity, relying on others to help with financial difficulties caused by
gambling, and/or jeopardizing a significant relationship, job, educational opportunity, or career
opportunity due to gambling (Wang, 2016).
Problem gambling can have disastrous consequences, and the question remains whether effective
preventative measures can be implemented. However, in order to contemplate potential preventative
measures, one must consider how problem gambling develops and is maintained. For instance, gamblers
often endorse various cognitive biases that contribute to their gambling behavior. In addition, affect plays
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an important role in whether one chooses to engage in risky behaviors, such as gambling. The issues of
cognitive biases and affect, including their relation to one another, will be further addressed.
Gambling and Cognitive Biases
From a cognitive perspective, gambling behavior is maintained by irrational beliefs or cognitive
biases (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002). Examples of gambling-related cognitive biases
include believing that future outcomes of a random event can be predicted based on previous outcomes
(i.e., the gambler’s fallacy), believing that certain strategies can increase the chances of winning, or
attributing positive outcomes to internal factors (e.g., skill) and negative outcomes to external factors
(Emond & Marmurek, 2010; Gobet & Schiller, 2011; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002). Though
individuals tend to rely on these beliefs when they gamble, these beliefs are inaccurate. It is likely that
early gambling experiences, such as big wins, contribute to the development of cognitive biases (Sharpe,
2002). These cognitive biases then cause people to focus on positive outcomes more so than negative
outcomes associated with gambling behavior.
These cognitive biases stem from a reliance on automatic thought processes. Kahneman (2011)
argues that there are two separate systems of thought processes. System 1 is automatic, quick, and
intuitive. Also referred to as “fast” thinking, this system requires very little cognitive effort and offers no
sense of voluntary control (Kahneman, 2011). Capabilities of System 1 include innate skills (e.g.,
perception) as well as learned skills that have become automatic through continued practice (e.g.,
reading). On the other hand, System 2 is slower and requires more cognitive effort and attention.
Examples of System 2 capabilities include comparing items, counting the number of times someone says
“like” during a class presentation, and self-control. Though both systems have their own set of
capabilities, they often work together.
System 2 has limited resources and typically runs at low-effort levels unless called upon
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 generates suggestions for System 2 (e.g., beliefs, feelings, ideas), and the
suggestions become actions if endorsed by System 2. Sometimes, System 2 will suppress a suggestion
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from System 1 or modify it. This process usually happens with little effort. However, sometimes the
process is not as simple and System 1 must defer to System 2. System 2 must be mobilized (i.e.,
temporarily stop functioning at a low effort level to allocate resources to the current situation) when
System 1 cannot generate an answer or when an event occurs that goes against System 1’s expectations
(e.g., when one is surprised). System 1 is usually effective in making judgments and decisions, but it is
not perfect. Therefore, it is prone to errors and biases. However, both systems are responsible when an
error occurs. System 1 may have generated the suggestion, but System 2 endorsed the suggestion and
allowed it to be expressed into action. System 2 may endorse an incorrect suggestion from System 1
because System 2 did not realize the suggestion was incorrect or because System 2 did not apply the
appropriate cognitive effort to catch the error. Errors can stem from cognitive biases (e.g., irrational
thinking) or the use of heuristics. There are several cognitive biases and heuristics that are common to
gambling.
A heuristic is a simple process that allows one to find an acceptable, though potentially imperfect,
answer to a difficult question (Kahneman, 2011). When System 1 has difficulty generating a suggestion, it
may employ the use of a heuristic to find a simpler answer. Though heuristics can be effective, they are
not foolproof. System 2 does have the ability to reject a heuristic answer; however, System 2 often
chooses to employ the least amount of cognitive effort necessary. Therefore, heuristic answers suggested
by System 1 are often endorsed by System 2, even if the heuristic is incorrect. The tendency to rely on
System 1 instead of the effortful System 2 can likely to be attributed to the idea that humans are cognitive
misers (Fiske, 1980; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Humans tend to use cognitive simplifying
tools, such as heuristics, to preserve cognitive resources when possible.
The representativeness heuristic and the gambler’s fallacy. One cognitive error common to
gambling is the representativeness heuristic, which involves judging probabilities based on how
representative “A” is of “B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This method can lead to misconceptions of
chance, which contributes to the gambler’s fallacy (i.e., believing that future outcomes of a random event
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can be predicted based on previous outcomes). When the representativeness heuristic is used, it is
expected that a random sequence of events will be representative of the possible outcomes, even if the
sequence is short. For gambling, this means that people believe that the sequence of events generated
when gambling should be representative of the potential outcomes (i.e., representative sequence of both
wins and losses). Therefore, people often believe a win is due when they are faced with multiple losses.
Individuals tend to believe that a deviation in one direction (e.g., a loss) should cause a deviation in the
other direction (i.e., a win), even though this belief violates the laws of chance (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
Cognitive Biases. System 1 can also give rise to cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2011). A cognitive
bias can be defined as an implicit association that distorts judgment away from the norms of rationality
(Holroyd, 2015). Cognitive biases are difficult to prevent because they occur at an automatic level.
Though System 2 has the capacity to prevent one from acting on a cognitive bias, the fact that System 2
has limited resources can keep this from happening. In addition, it is impractical for System 2 to replace
System 1 for routine decision-making, as System 2 is too slow. There are often many cognitive biases
present in gamblers, which may be due to the fact that repetition (i.e., repeated gambling, in this case)
increases reliance on System 1. A slot machine is a common form of gambling that is very repetitive. All
that is required is for one to press a button or pull a lever repeatedly to keep the reels spinning. Mccusker
and Gettings (1997) argued that they provided evidence that cognitive biases operate at an automatic
level. In their experiment, problem gamblers completed a Stroop task. Participants were asked to view
words presented in different colors, and say the name of the color of the word out loud. Participants
viewed neutral words, gambling related words, and words pertaining to other addictions (e.g., drugs).
Participants demonstrated slower reaction times (for naming the color of the word) on gambling related
words than neutral words or words pertaining to other addictions. These results indicated that there was
interference, which made it difficult to suppress gambling-related information. Concentrating on naming
the color out loud required cognitive effort, and therefore activated System 2. However, System 1
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interfered with System 2 on trials containing gambling-related words. This interference resulted in slower
reaction times on these trials.
Illusion of Control. The illusion of control may stem from a misconception of luck versus chance.
Though academic conceptions of luck and chance may be virtually the same, individuals tend to view
chance as something that is external and uncontrollable, while luck is something internal that they can
“use” (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). In other words, people feel more confident about
their chances of winning when they feel as though they have control over some aspect of a situation (e.g.,
choosing their own numbers) because they think they can use their luck to make the desired outcome
more likely to happen. Interviews with gamblers revealed that most believed gambling outcomes were
due to combinations of chance, luck, and skill. This demonstrates that gamblers do not perceive chance
and luck to be the same. Though System 2 likely contains the knowledge (i.e., luck and chance are
virtually the same, and cannot be controlled) to suppress this cognitive illusion, it often does not engage
the required cognitive effort to reject the suggestion from System 1.
Gamblers exhibit a perceived illusion of control over the outcome of a game, even though the
outcome is due to chance. This cognitive bias leads them to believe that certain rituals (e.g., blowing on
the dice before rolling them) or strategies can increase their chance to win or that they can predict the
outcome (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). When participants were given the chance to
choose their own lottery ticket, they reported feeling as though they had greater chances of winning and
greater perceptions of personal luck than participants who were not allowed to choose their own lottery
ticket (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). In addition, a positive relationship was found between perceived chance of
winning and perceived personal luck. The authors attributed this to the idea that participants believed they
could use their personal luck to increase their chance of winning. A similar study involved playing
roulette (Dixon, 2000). Participants could choose their own chip placement on some trials and the dealer
chose their chip placement on other trials. Participants placed higher bets when they could control their
chip placement than when the dealer controlled the chip placement. In addition, when asked how likely
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they thought their chances of winning were, participants overestimated their chances of winning when
they controlled the chip placement and underestimated their chances of winning when the dealer
controlled the chip placement. These studies provide evidence for the idea that illusion of control leads
one to believe they can increase their opportunity to win a game of chance.
Affect
Affect plays an important role in the decision-making process, and can influence one’s decision
on whether to engage in a risky behavior such as gambling (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Kahneman,
2011; Schwarz, 2012). Affect, mood, and emotion are terms that are often used interchangeably. Mood
refers to a relatively enduring affective state that does not necessarily have a known cause, emotion refers
to an intense, short lived feeling with a known cause, and affect refers to a general state that encompasses
both mood and emotion (Forgas, 1995). There are two main types of emotions related to decisions:
integral emotions and incidental emotions. Integral emotions are produced in response to the specific
decision or task at hand; however, incidental emotions are irrelevant to the decision or task at hand and
are the results of unrelated factors such as affect (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
According to the affect as information approach, emotions are incorporated into information used
to make decisions, whether they are relevant to the target decision/task or not (Clore et al., 2001;
Schwarz, 2012). The way in which affective states influence cognitive evaluations depends on the
subjective experience of the affective state (Clore et al., 2001). In other words, the way affective
information is experienced (e.g., intensity of affective information or the amount of attention the affective
information receives) plays an important role in one’s cognitive evaluations of a judgment, decision,
and/or task. Emotions provide conscious information from unconscious appraisals of situations. These
emotions are used as feedback to guide decisions because they are experienced as information about a
target. Affective information deals with how something makes you feel (e.g., good or bad) and/or how
you feel about something (e.g., like or dislike). The value of affective information and its effect on
cognitive evaluations depends on how the affective experience is attributed. Affective information only
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influences judgment and decision-making if the affective information is attributed towards the object of
judgment and/or the task at hand. Incidental emotions often provide affective information, but this
information can be misleading (Schwarz, 2012). Feelings can be misattributed to an object/task that was
not the actual reason for the feelings. Moods that result from background affective information that one is
not completely aware of (i.e., incidental emotions) are often subject to misattribution. This happens
because people are often much more sensitive to their feelings than where the feelings come from
(Schwarz, 2012). People typically assume that their current feelings are about whatever is in their mind
and/or has their attention at that moment. The use of affect as information does not require conscious
attribution to an object. In other words, affect can be used as information at an automatic level (System
1), and does not necessarily require cognitive effort from System 2. System 1 is prone to errors (which
System 2 often endorses), which also explains why affect can be misattributed to an incorrect source.
Therefore, when individuals are gambling, they are likely relying on System 1 thinking and they may
misattribute background affective information to the game (e.g., slot machine, video poker, blackjack,
etc.) they are currently playing
Positive and Negative Affective Processing. Affective reactions can be experienced differently
depending on the judgment, decision, or task at hand. The affective processing principle states that
affective information may be experienced as performance feedback when one is performing a task (Clore
et al., 2001). In this case, positive affect may be experienced as feelings of confidence about one’s ability
to perform the task (e.g., gambling), therefore leading to greater reliance on one’s own beliefs,
expectations, and inclinations.
When one is task-oriented, positive affect increases top-down processing, which relies on
information such as context, one’s personal knowledge, beliefs, and expectations. In other words, positive
affect increases the use of System 1. Positive affect gives one a state of cognitive ease, which makes one
more likely to be in a good mood, like what they see, and trust their intuitions (Kahneman, 2011). When
one is experiencing a positive mood, a less vigilant thinking process is employed (i.e., System 1). On the
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other hand, negative affect may be experienced as doubt about one’s ability to perform the task, therefore
leading to lesser reliance on one’s own beliefs, expectations, and inclinations. In this case, negative affect
increases bottom-up processing, which relies on data-based information from the environment instead of
internal information. In other words, negative affect increases the use of System 2. Negative affect
promotes a state of cognitive strain, which causes one to be more vigilant and suspicious, use more effort,
and rely less on intuitions (Kahneman, 2011). When one is experiencing a negative mood, a more vigilant
thinking process is employed (i.e., System 2).
Positive affect has been shown to cause individuals to overestimate the likelihood of positive
events, underestimate the likelihood of negative events (Wright & Bower, 1992), and to increase risk
taking (Grable & Roszkowski, 2008; Stanton, Reek, Huettal, & LaBar, 2014; Schulreich et al., 2014).
Since positive affect increases reliance on System 1, it reduces vigilance. When primed with happy music,
participants were more likely to choose risky lottery choices (Schulreich et al., 2014). This is consistent
with the results that those in a positive mood are more willing to take financial risks (Grable &
Roszkowski, 2008) and gamble recklessly (Cummins, Nadorff, & Kelly, 2009; Stanton et al., 2014). This
effect has been seen outside the laboratory as well. Researchers found that factors that caused incidental
positive affect (such as sunny weather and local sports teams winning games) were positively related to
the number of lottery tickets sold (Otto, Fleming, & Glimcher, 2016). When people were in a good mood,
they were more likely to take a risk and buy a lottery ticket. The authors posed that positive affect may
facilitate an optimism bias, which was defined by Sharot (2011) as the difference between one’s
expectations and reality. When expectations are better than reality, it is considered an optimistic
expectation. As with other cognitive biases, the optimism bias likely stems from System 1. This has
important implications for gambling behavior, as problem gamblers who recently quit identified positive
affect (Holub, Hodgins, & Peden, 2005) and feelings of optimism about their chances of winning
(Hodgins & el-Guebaly, 2004) as factors associated with a higher likelihood of a major relapse.
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Negative affect is often associated with risk aversiveness, which likely stems from an increased
reliance on the more vigilant System 2. Those in a negative mood are more likely to underestimate the
likelihood of positive events and overestimate the likelihood of negative events (Wright & Bower, 1992),
which contributes to more risk-aversion (Yuen & Lee, 2003; Schulreich et al., 2014; Schulreich,
Gerhardt, & Heekeren, 2016). When primed with negative affective stimuli (i.e., fearful stimuli),
participants were less likely to accept a gamble, which indicates risk-aversiveness (Schulreich et al.,
2016). Negative affect likely mobilized System 2, which increased vigilance and cognitive effort.
Participants also demonstrated risk-averse behavior when primed with sad music (Schulreich et al., 2014).
After listening to sad music, participants were less likely to take a risky gamble than participants primed
with happy music, random musical tones, or no music. Similarly, participants were also less likely to take
a risky gamble after watching a sad film clip (Yuen & Lee, 2003). When given the option between a
predictable, small reward and a risky, large reward, participants in an induced sad mood were less likely
to take a risk than those who watched a happy or neutral film clip.
Affect has strong implications for the judgment and decision-making process, particularly in
terms of whether one chooses to engage in risky behaviors. When experiencing positive affect, System 2
is more likely to remain in a low effort mode and allow System 1 to handle the decisions at hand.
Therefore, people are more likely to take risks when they are experiencing positive affect. This is because
positive affect causes people to trust their intuitions and is often viewed as confidence about a decision or
performance on a task. When one is experiencing positive affect while gambling, they may feel more
confident that they will win, and subsequently be more likely to gamble. On the other hand, System 2 is
more likely to take over and expend cognitive effort when one is experiencing negative affect. Negative
affect causes people to be more vigilant and cautious about decisions and is often experienced as doubt
about a decision or performance on a task. Therefore, people are less likely to take risks when
experiencing negative affect. When one is experiencing negative affect while gambling, they may feel
doubtful about their chance of winning and subsequently be less likely to gamble. Positive or negative
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affect can arise from incidental emotions, but may be misattributed to the current decision or task at hand.
This allows affect, regardless of the original source, to influence many decisions and judgments.
Gambling Warning Messages
There are many opportunities for background affective information to be misattributed to the act
of gambling itself. Affective information can stem from the weather (Otto et al., 2016), feelings about
how one’s day has been, the gambling venue (e.g., lights, music, people, etc.), or numerous other factors.
Depending on how the affective information is experienced (i.e., positively or negatively), it could
potentially increase the likelihood that one will gamble. However, excessive gambling can have many
negative effects on one’s life. Therefore, some believe that gambling venues should have mandatory
warning messages to caution patrons against the dangers associated with excessive gambling
(Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Shaffer, 2004; Ginley, Whelan, Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017; Steenbergh,
Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004). They argue that federal regulations have been implemented to
caution consumers against other potentially harmful products, such as alcohol and tobacco; therefore,
these regulations should extend to gambling venues as well. Blaszczynski and colleagues (2004) note that
the decision to gamble is ultimately that of the individual; however, consumers should have the right to
make an informed decision and the gambling industry should not intentionally exploit consumers. There
are various factors that play into creating an effective warning, including message type (static versus popup), timing, and content.
Static warnings posted around the venue (signs on walls, gambling machines, etc.) are ineffective
(Monahgan, Blaszczynski, & Nower, 2009). These posted warnings did not reduce gambling behavior or
gambling related cognitive biases and participants could not recall the content of the warnings. These
findings led researchers to explore other options for displaying effective warning messages. Compared to
static warnings, pop-up warning messages were found to be much more effective (Monaghan &
Blaszczynski, 2010). Pop-up messages are messages that “pop up” on the screen of an electronic
gambling machine (e.g., slot machine or video poker) during gameplay. These messages take up a portion
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of the screen, and interrupt play for a brief period of time to display a message. Monaghan and
Blaszczynski (2010) tested the comparison of these two methods (static and pop-up warning messages) on
both undergraduate students and patrons of a gambling venue. All participants, including those recruited
from a gambling venue, played on a simulated electronic gambling machine (EGM). Some participants
received warning messages in the form of static sign posted near the machine, while others received popup messages during gameplay. No behavioral data was collected regarding gambling behavior or patterns.
Participants who received pop-up warning messages during game play indicated via self-report measures
that the messages caused them to stop playing earlier, place smaller bets, and slow their rate of betting.
These effects were not reported for those who received posted warnings. Participants who received popup messages also had significantly higher recall of the warning message content than those who received
posted warnings. This same effect was indicated through a two-week follow-up questionnaire;
participants were more likely to accurately recall the content of the pop-up messages than the static signs.
In a naturalistic study of online gamblers, those who received pop-up warning messages were more likely
to discontinue play sooner than those who did not receive warning messages (Auer, Malischnig, &
Griffiths, 2014).
It was questioned whether the fact that these pop-up warning messages caused a forced break in
play was responsible for reducing gambling behavior rather than the content of the messages themselves;
however, when participants were presented with blank pop-up messages, their gambling behavior was not
reduced and their desire to continue playing increased (Blaszczynski, Cowley, Anthony, & Hinsley,
2016). This indicates that any observed reduction in gambling behavior is due to the content of the
warning messages and not simply being forced to stop play temporarily.
Timing of the pop-up messages also appears relevant. Studies that have successfully reduced
gambling behavior through messages aimed to correct cognitive biases programmed the messages to
appear periodically throughout game play. When the pop-up messages appear before play and do not reappear at all during play, they are not effective at reducing gambling behavior (Steenbergh et al., 2004).
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This is likely because individuals do not maintain the same level of rational thinking while gambling as
they do when they are not gambling (Pelletier & Ladouceur, 2007). This has been referred to as “double
switching,” meaning that people can have rational beliefs about gambling, but turn them “off” while
gambling (Sévigny & Ladouceur, 2003). In other words, one might think that their chances of winning the
jackpot are slim while not gambling (i.e., rational thinking switched on), but then start to think their
chances to win are much better once they start gambling (i.e., rational thinking switched off). Then, once
they are finished gambling, they once again believe that their chances of winning the jackpot are low (i.e.,
rational thinking switched on). Once again, this could be attributed to the fact that repetition (e.g.,
repeatedly press the “spin” button on a slot machine) increases reliance on System 1. When one is not
gambling, System 2 may suppress the suggestion from System 1 that the likelihood of winning the
jackpot is high. Then, with repetition of gambling, an increased reliance on System 1 could cause System
2 to not use its limited cognitive resources to suppress System 1, therefore allowing System 1 to express
beliefs that the chances of winning the jackpot are high. This suggests that messages to correct cognitive
biases should be presented throughout game play to help individuals maintain a rational level of thinking
(i.e., rely less on System 1).
The content of the warning messages is a crucial factor. Research has suggested that warning
messages intended to reduce gambling-related cognitive biases are more effective than messages that
provide information about the amount of time and money spent on a gambling session (Ginley et al.,
2017). For example, Floyd, Whelan, and Meyers (2006) presented participants with messages such as,
“CAUTION: The result of any spin has nothing to do with previous spins” or “CAUTION: Winning is
completely due to chance. No luck is involved.” Several studies have shown that when presented with
these messages during game play, individuals stop play earlier and place smaller bets (Benhsain, et al.,
2004; Floyd et al., 2006; Jardin & Wulfert, 2009; Jardin & Wulfert, 2012; May, Whelan, Meyers, &
Steenbergh, 2005). This effect has even been shown in experienced gamblers, defined as those who
gamble at least twice per week (Jardin & Wulfert, 2012). Jardin and Wulfert (2009) found that warnings
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that provided accurate information about gambling contingencies were more effective in reducing
gambling behavior (in terms of stopping play earlier and spending less money) than messages unrelated to
the game or no messages at all. When presented with messages regarding the independence of events,
participants demonstrated decreased cognitive biases and increased motivation to discontinue gambling
than participants who received control messages simply stating they must press “okay” to continue
(Benhsain, Taillefer, & Ladouceur, 2004). However, one study found that messages aimed at correcting
the illusion of control while gambling reduced cognitive biases, but did not reduce the number of games
played (Cloutier, Ladouceur, & Sévigny, 2006). It should be noted that this study only measured the
number of games played, and not the amount of money bet per game. It could be possible that the chosen
dependent variable was not sufficient to replicate the results of previous studies. The success of previous
studies that have employed gambling warning messages aimed at correcting cognitive biases indicates
that this can be an effective method to reduce gambling behavior.
Cognitive biases cannot be eliminated, because they occur at an automatic level. However, their
effect can be weakened. Many people are not aware of their cognitive biases because of the automaticity
of System 1. Research on implicit bias reduction has found that increasing awareness of one’s cognitive
biases can help weaken their effect on decision-making (Croskerry, 2003; Devine, Forscher, Austin, &
Cox, 2012; Jackson, Hillard, & Schneider, 2014). Being aware of cognitive biases can help introduce selfmonitoring (e.g., System 2) of one’s decisions, leading to fewer cognitive errors (Croskerry, 2003). If one
can recognize that they are in a situation in which they are prone to experiencing cognitive biases, System
2 can be “called on” for help (Kahneman, 2011). Warning messages aimed to correct these biases could
help increase awareness of common gambling related cognitive biases, and serve as a reminder that one is
in a situation (e.g., gambling in a casino) where they are prone to cognitive errors. With repeated
exposure to these messages, System 2 should learn to not endorse the incorrect suggestions from System
1. When presented with information that challenges beliefs of System 1, System 2 can be activated and
choose to accept the contrary information.
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Evidence from research suggests implementing mandatory gambling warning messages could be
a viable option for preventing the development of problem gambling. Previous research has indicated that
pop-up warning messages are not very disruptive and do not hinder one’s enjoyment while gambling
(Palmer du Preez, Landon, Bellringer, Garrett, & Abbott, 2016). To be the most effective, previous
research suggests that these warning messages should attempt to correct common gambling-related
cognitive biases, such as the gambler’s fallacy or the illusion of control. The goal of these warning
messages would be to reduce reliance on System 1 thinking, and subsequently increase reliance on
System 2 thinking. If System 2 thinking is activated, then one should be more vigilant in the decisionmaking process.
Current Study
The current study is an attempt to merge two separate bodies of research that have not been
previously explored in the context of one another. If a case is to be made for implementing mandatory
gambling warning messages, their effectiveness must be examined in all contexts. As affect plays an
important role in the decision-making process, it is important to examine if the effectiveness of gambling
warning messages is modulated by affect. Based on previous research, the following hypotheses have
been constructed:
Hypothesis 1: Those induced with positive affect will display higher levels of risk-taking
behavior than those who are induced with negative affect.
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction effect between the affect and warning message
conditions.
2a: Those in the positive affect with warning messages condition will not differ in levels
of risk-taking behavior from the positive affect without warning messages condition.
2b: Those in the negative affect with warning messages condition will display lower
levels of risk-taking than those in the negative affect without warning messages
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condition, the positive affect with warning messages condition, and the positive affect
without warning messages condition.
Previous research has already demonstrated that positive affect is associated with increased risktaking, while negative affect is associated with decreased risk-taking. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is expected
to replicate findings of existing research.
Hypothesis 2a suggests that warning messages will not reduce gambling behavior for those
induced with positive affect. Positive affect increases risk-taking behaviors, likely due to more reliance on
System 1. Reliance on System 1 is also increased during repetitive tasks (e.g., gambling). Though System
2 has the capacity to suppress System 1, it often chooses the easier (i.e., requires less cognitive effort)
route of simply accepting System 1’s suggestions due to limited resources (Kahneman, 2011). With both
positive affect and repetition causing an increase in reliance on System 1, it is hypothesized that System 2
will choose to endorse System 1’s suggestions to spare cognitive resources.
Hypothesis 2b suggests that participants who are induced with negative affect and receive
warning messages should display the lowest levels of risk-taking. Negative affect mobilizes System 2,
and causes one to be more vigilant and suspicious. With System 2 already mobilized, it is hypothesized
that warning messages will increase vigilance further. In this case, System 2 should suppress any
suggestions of cognitive biases from System 1 that would lead to more risky behavior.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
A power analysis indicated that at least sixty-six participants would be necessary to detect any
significant effects. The power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1. The parameters of the power
analysis were α = 0.05, power = 0.80, and ηp2 = 0.11, which was the smallest reported ηp2 in previous
research (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). This indicated that a medium to large effect
size could be expected.
A total of 104 participants completed the study, but four participants were excluded from the
analyses for failing at least one attention check question. Participants included 59 women and 41 men
with a mean age of 19.47 years old (See Table 1). Participants were recruited from undergraduate
psychology classes at Georgia Southern University through the SONA system and participated to fulfill a
course requirement.
Overview
The study was completed in-person. Each participant came into the lab individually and
completed all measures on a computer. All materials in this experiment were presented through E-Prime
2.0. The study took approximately twenty minutes to complete. Half of the participants were induced with
positive affect using a standardized method and half were induced with negative affect using a
standardized method. In addition, half of the participants received gambling warning messages during a
computerized gambling task and half received no messages. These two variables were counterbalanced to
produce four distinct experimental conditions: a positive affect induced with warning messages condition
(hereafter referred to as PM+); positive affect induced without warning messages condition (PM-);
negative affect induced with warning messages condition (NM+); and negative affect induced without
warning messages condition (NM-). Participants were assigned to one of these four conditions when they
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signed up for the experiment. In each condition, participants completed self-report measures and a
behavioral measure of risk-taking (See Figure 1).
Materials
Affect Measure. Participants were given the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) twice. First to establish baseline affect levels at the beginning of the
experiment and then to detect any change in affect level after viewing the emotional stimuli (Appendix
A). The PANAS is a 20-item scale that was developed to assess positive and negative affect. Previous
research has demonstrated that the PANAS has good construct validity and reliability (Crawford &
Henry, 2004). The internal consistency for the current sample was calculated for both the positive affect
scale (Cronbach’s α = .84) and the negative affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .86) for the PANAS 1 and for
both the positive affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .87) and the negative affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .86) for
the PANAS 2.
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were currently feeling a variety of
positive and negative emotions on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). To score
this scale, the average of participants’ responses on all positive affective words was calculated, as well as
the average of participants’ responses on all negative affective words. This resulted in each participant
receiving two PANAS scores (a positive score and a negative score).
Affective Stimuli. The affective stimuli consisted of two film clips chosen from an empirically
validated database of emotion eliciting film clips (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010). Film clips
are an effective mood induction procedure (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross,
2007; Schaefer et al., 2010; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Film clips are low in demand
characteristics, high in attentional capture, and elicit longer lasting affective states than still pictures
(Rottenberg et al., 2007). Participants viewed one film clip, depending on which affective condition they
were randomly assigned to. In the positive affect condition, participants viewed a scene from Dead Poet’s
Society. In this scene, students expressed their support for their teacher. This film clip was chosen because
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it ranked high in positive affect and arousal (i.e., intensity). In the negative affect condition, participants
viewed a scene from Misery. In this scene, a woman prepares to break the ankles of a man she is holding
captive. This film clip was chosen because it ranked high in negative affect and arousal. Each film clip
was two minutes and twenty-four seconds in length.
Behavioral Measure. To measure gambling/risk-taking behavior, participants completed a
computerized game, The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). The BART correlates
with self-reported levels of real world risk-taking, including gambling (Wallsten, Pleskac, & Lejuez,
2005). The BART also has good test-retest reliability, meaning that a participant’s performance on the
task on one occasion should be representative of their performance on the task on other occasions (White,
Lejuez, & Wit, 2008).
Self-Reported Risk-Taking. Participants were given the 40-item Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
scale (DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) to establish self-reported levels of real-world risk-taking
behavior in financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical, and social domains (Appendix B). This scale was
chosen to see if performance on the BART correlates with self-reported measures of risk-taking across
different domains. Previous research has demonstrated that the BART is positively correlated with selfreported risk-taking (Wallsten et al., 2005), and the current study expected to replicate these findings by
analyzing the relationship between BART performance and scores on the DOPSERT domains.
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would engage in a variety of risky
behaviors on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants received a total of six
DOSPERT scores: a social domain score, health/safety domain score, financial domain score, ethical
domain score, recreational domain score, and an overall score. The overall score was calculated by
averaging participants’ responses on all DOSPERT items. The scores for each of the five domains were
calculated by averaging participants’ responses for each DOPSERT item that fell within that domain. For
example, to calculate participants’ score for the social domain, only responses on DOSPERT items
classified under the social domain were averaged to calculate the score. The internal consistency for the

25
current sample was calculated for the overall DOSPERT (Cronbach’s α = .83), ethical domain
(Cronbach’s α = .73), financial domain (Cronbach’s α = .77), recreational domain (Cronbach’s α = .79),
social domain (Cronbach’s α = .61), and health/safety domain (Cronbach’s α = .66).
Procedure
All participants recruited from the Georgia Southern University Department of Psychology were
provided an informed consent upon entry to the lab. All questions about participants’ roles as participants
were answered at the time of participation. All measures and tasks were presented in a computerized
format through E-Prime 2.0. All participants wore headphones while completing the study.
To establish baseline affect levels, participants in all conditions were given the Positive and
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) to assess the extent to which they felt a variety of emotions at that point
in time. During the PANAS, two attention check questions were included. For example, one attention
check question prompted participants to “press 5.” These two questions were implemented to ensure that
participants were paying attention during the study. After completing the PANAS, participants in PM+
and PM- conditions were primed with the positive film clip (Dead Poet’s Society) and participants in the
NM+ and NM- conditions were primed with the negative film clip (Misery). After viewing the film clip,
participants moved on to the behavioral measure.
Participants in all conditions completed a computerized game, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART), as a behavioral measure of risk-taking. Participants viewed a screen that welcomed them to the
“Balloon Pumping Game” and provided them with written instructions. Participants were told that the
object of the game was to obtain as many points as possible. Points were earned by pumping the balloon
up without popping the balloon. Participants were told that the balloon would explode at some point,
which could be as early as the first pump or not until the balloon had fully expanded. Once participants
viewed the instructions, they moved on to complete one practice trial prior to moving on to the
experimental trials. Participants were presented with a simulated balloon, the number of points earned on
the current balloon, and the total number of points earned throughout the task (See Figure 2). Participants
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were asked to “pump” the balloon (by pressing the “P” key). Participants earned ten points for each pump
they made, provided they did not pop the balloon. Participants could pump the balloon as many times as
they wished, or until the balloon burst. If the balloon burst, all points accumulated for that round were
lost. If the participant stopped pumping (by pressing the “S” key) before the balloon burst, they kept all
points earned on that round. Upon completion on the practice trial, participants moved on to complete the
thirty experimental trials. The average number of pumps that participants made on each balloon that did
not burst was used as the primary dependent measure of risk-taking. Higher numbers of pumps per
balloon indicate higher levels of risk-taking. After each trial, a feedback screen (white background with
black text) appeared (See Figure 2). The feedback screen either said “Congratulations! You won “x”
points on that balloon!” or “Sorry, that balloon broke!” After one second, the feedback screen
disappeared, and participants moved on to the next trial.
During the BART, half of participants received computerized pop-up warning messages. These
messages contained information intended to correct/reduce cognitive biases related to gambling. There
were five different warning messages. Pop-up warning messages appeared every five trials. Therefore,
participants in the warning message condition received a warning message upon the completion of the
fifth, tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth trials. Participants received one warning message at a
time, and participants received the warning messages in the same order. After the fifth BART trial, the
warning message read: “You cannot control a game of chance.” After the tenth trial, the warning message
read: “This is a game of chance. No luck is involved.” After the fifteenth trial, the warning message read:
“There are no strategies that will improve your chance of winning.” After the twentieth trial, the warning
message read: “This is a game of chance. No skill is involved.” The last warning message appeared after
the twenty-fifth trial and read: “You cannot predict whether you will win or lose.” Warning messages
appeared on the feedback screen, above the feedback information. To make the warning messages salient,
the messages were placed on a red octagon with white text (see Figure 2). The usual feedback information
remained the same (white background with black text). Under the feedback information, participants also

27
saw a prompt to press space to continue. Participants were asked to press space to continue during
warning message trials to ensure they had enough time to view and read the message before moving on.
Those in the no warnings groups did not receive these messages and played the BART uninterrupted.
After completing the gambling task, participants completed the PANAS a second time to measure
changes in affect levels after viewing the emotional stimuli and completing the BART. It was decided to
place the second PANAS here instead of immediately after the film clip for several reasons. First, it was
determined that it may be interesting to see if there were any changes in affect levels after the BART (i.e.,
if the BART itself affected affect levels), but there were concerns that having participants complete the
PANAS three times (baseline levels, levels after the film clip, and levels after the BART) would cause
participant fatigue. In addition, there were concerns that if participants completed the PANAS a second
time prior to completing the BART, any effects of the affect manipulation may have worn off before
participants started the BART. Based on previous studies that successfully induced positive and negative
affect with the same film clips (Elices et al., 2012; Gartner & Bajbouj, 2014; Hinojosaa, FernándezFolgueirasa, Alberta, Santanielloa, Pozoa, & Capillac, 2017; Karsdorp, Ranson, Nijst, & Vlaeyen, 2012;
Lalot, Delplanque, & Sander, 2014; Rennung & Gõritz, 2015; Schaefer et al., 2010), it was decided that
the films were validated enough to justify not placing a PANAS scale directly after the film clip. As with
the first round of the PANAS, two attention check questions were included, which prompted participants
to press a specific number if they were paying attention.
Once participants finished the PANAS, they completed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale to measure risk-taking in five domains (financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical,
and social). For this scale, participants rated the likelihood that they would engage in a wide variety of
risky behaviors. As with the PANAS, two attention check questions were placed within the scale. These
attention checks were worded differently to fit with the format of the DOSPERT questions. For example,
one attention check question read, “If you are paying attention, please press 2.”
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After completion of the DOSPERT, participants were asked four demographic questions.
Participants were first asked to enter their age (in years), and then their gender. Then participants were
asked to indicate, with a yes or no response, whether they had ever been given a mental health diagnosis,
and then whether they currently had a mental health diagnosis. Participants were not asked to elaborate on
any mental health diagnoses. Demographic information was obtained with the intention of conducting
exploratory analyses to see whether age, gender, or mental health accounted for any differences in
performance on the BART or self-reported risk-taking on the DOSPERT. For example, individuals who
have been given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder tend to engage in more risky behaviors than individuals
who have not been given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder (Mason, O’Sullivan, Montaldi, Bentall, & ElDeredy, 2014). Self-reported mental health was included in the demographics to ensure that mental health
did not affect the results of the study.
After all measurements were completed, the study was concluded by debriefing participants about
the nature of the study. During the debriefing, all participants were led through a short breathing exercise
shown to reduce negative affect (Ma et al., 2017). During this short exercise, participants engaged in
diaphragmatic breathing. Participants were asked to inhale slowly and deeply, allowing their abdomen to
expand. On exhale, the breath was slowly released, allowing the abdomen to contract. Participants were
asked to take a few of these breaths at their own pace, and return to their normal breathing when ready.
By leading participants through this exercise, we hoped to mitigate any lingering feelings of negative
affect and return participants to their baseline mood levels. After completing the breathing exercise,
participants were asked what they thought about the study and if they used any strategies throughout the
study. Participants were also asked what they thought was being studied. This was asked to ensure no
participants were aware of exactly what was being studied, which could have potentially affected their
performance throughout the study. While some participants vaguely stated they believed the study was
looking at mood, emotions, or gambling, no participant stated anything other than information that was
given to them in the study title or on the informed consent. No participants indicated anything that would
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suggest they had guessed the directionality of the hypotheses of the study. Therefore, no participants were
removed from the analyses based on their answer to this question. Participants were then debriefed about
the general nature of the study and given an opportunity to ask questions.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Affect Manipulation Check
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to ensure the two affect groups did not differ
significantly on their baseline negative PANAS scores at the beginning of the experiment (See Table 1).
There was not a significant difference in baseline negative affect PANAS scores for those in the negative
affect condition (M = 1.74, SEM = .09) and those in the positive affect condition (M = 1.91, SEM = .11), t
(98) = -1.27, p = .21. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was also used to ensure that the two affect
groups did not differ significantly on their baseline positive PANAS scores at the beginning of the
experiment. There was not a significant difference in baseline positive affect PANAS scores for those in
the negative affect condition (M = 3.31, SEM = .10) and those in the positive affect condition (M = 3.23,
SEM = .09), t (98) = .62, p = .54.
A PANAS change score was calculated for each participant on both the positive and negative
PANAS scales. These scores were calculated by subtracting the positive affect score on the PANAS 2
from the positive affect score from PANAS 1 for each participant and subtracting the negative affect
score on the PANAS 2 from the negative affect score from PANAS 1 for each participant (See Table 2).
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was then used to determine whether there was a significant
change in positive affect for either affect condition. The PANAS positive affect scale change score for
those in the positive affect condition (M = -.05, SEM = .07) did not significantly differ from that for those
in the negative affect condition (M = -.08, SEM = .09), t (98) = -.23, p = .82.
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was then used to determine whether there was a
significant change in negative affect for either affect condition. The difference in the PANAS negative
affect change score between the positive and negative affect conditions indicated a trend towards
significance, in that those in the positive affect condition (M = -.22, SEM = .06) had a greater reduction in
negative affect than those in the negative affect condition (M = -.05, SEM = .08), t (98) = 1.79, p = .08.
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Warning Messages and Affect
A 2x2 between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effect of
affect condition (positive or negative) and warning message condition (messages or no messages) on risktaking behavior, measured as the average number of pumps on trials that participants chose to stop
pumping the balloon before it burst. For the main effect of affect, there was a trend towards a significant
difference in risk-taking between those who were induced with negative affect (M = 28.66, SEM = 1.68)
and those who were induced with positive affect (M = 24.80, SEM = 1.51), F(1, 99) = 2.89, p = .09, ηp2 =
.03. The main effect of warning message condition was not significant F(1, 99) = .59, p = .44, ηp2 = .01,
and those who received warning messages (M = 27.61, SEM = 1.55) did not differ from those who did not
receive warning messages (M = 25.85, SEM = 1.68). There was no significant interaction effect detected
between mood condition and warning message condition, F(1, 99) = .25, p = .62, ηp2 = .003, indicating no
significant differences between the positive affect with warning messages (M = 26.24, SEM = 2.27),
positive affect without warning messages (M = 23.36, SEM = 2.27), negative affect with warning
messages (M = 28.98, SEM = 2.23), and negative affect without warning messages (M = 28.35, SEM =
2.32) conditions (See Figure 3).
DOSPERT and BART
Pearson’s r was used to determine whether there was a relationship between a behavioral
measure of risk-taking (BART) and a self-reported measure of risk-taking (DOSPERT). The average
number of pumps on the BART was negatively related to self-reported risk-taking on the social domain of
the DOSPERT r (98) = -.22, p = .03. A higher average number of pumps on the BART was related to a
lower self-reported risk-taking score on the DOSPERT social domain (See Figure 4). There was not a
significant relationship between the average number of pumps on the BART and the DOSPERT financial
domain r (98) = -.02, p = .84, ethical domain r (98) = -.08, p = .41, health/safety domain r (98) = -.12, p =
.25, recreational domain r (98) = .01, p = .90, or overall DOSPERT score r (98) = -.12, p = .24 (See Table
3).
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Age
Pearson’s r was used to analyze the relationship between age and risk-taking behavior on the
BART, but no significant relationship was detected r (98) = -.01, p = .96 (See Table 3). Pearson’s r was
also used to analyze the relationship between age and self-reported risk-taking behavior on the
DOSPERT, but age was not related to self-reported risk-taking in the DOSPERT ethical domain r (98) = .11, p = .27, financial domain r (98) = -.18 p = .08, health/safety domain r (98) = -.06, p = .56,
recreational domain r (98) = -.05, p = .60, social domain r (98) = -.06, p = .56, or overall DOSPERT score
r (98) = -.11, p = .27 (See Table 3).
Gender
Previous research has demonstrated that there are often gender differences in risk-taking, with
males typically exhibiting more risk-taking behavior than females (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999;
Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006). A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was
used to analyze the difference between risk-taking behaviors on the BART based on gender. Male
participants pumped the balloon more on average (M = 29.94, SEM = 2.10) than female participants (M =
24.51, SEM = 1.20), t (98) = 2.40, p = .02 (See Figure 5). An ANOVA that built upon the above reported
warning messages and affect analyses and included gender as an additional between-subjects factor
revealed no significant interactions between gender and mood condition or warning message condition.
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to analyze the difference between self-reported
risk-taking behaviors on the DOSPERT based on gender (See Figure 6). Men reported being more likely
to take financial risks (M = 2.38, SEM = .10) than women (M = 1.97, SEM = .08), t (98) = 3.07, p = .003.
In addition, women reported being more likely to take social risks (M = 3.80, SEM = .07) than men (M =
3.47, SD = .08), t (98) = -3.07, p = .003. There was not a significant difference in participants’ overall
DOSPERT scores t (98) = .19, p = .85, or their scores on the ethical domain t (98) = -.26, p = .80,
health/safety domain t (98) = -.51, p = .61, or recreational domain t (98) = .62, p = .54 based on gender.
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Mental Health
A total of 21 participants reported a mental health diagnosis (14 women, 7 men), and 17
participants indicated that they currently have a mental health diagnosis (11 women, 6 men; See Table 1).
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to analyze the difference between self-reported
mental health and risk-taking behavior on the BART. There was not a significant difference in the
average number of pumps on the BART for those who have ever been given a mental health diagnosis (M
= 24.71, SEM = 2.22) and those who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 27.27, SEM =
1.32), t (98) = -.92, p = .36. There was not a significant difference in risk-taking for those who currently
have a mental health diagnosis (M = 23.23, SEM = 2.12) and those who do not currently have a mental
health diagnosis (M = 27.45, SEM = 1.29), t (98) = -1.40, p = .17.
Two-tailed, independent samples t-tests were used to analyze the difference between self-reported
mental health (in terms of having ever received a mental health diagnosis) and self-reported risk-taking
behavior on the DOSPERT (See Figure 7). Participants who reported that they have ever been given a
mental health diagnosis reported being more likely to take health risks (M = 3.14, SEM = .14) than
participants who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 2.65, SEM = .08), t (98) = 2.98, p
= .004. Participants who reported that they have ever been given a mental health diagnosis also reported
being more likely to take social risks (M = 3.92, SEM = .13) than participants who have never been given
a mental health diagnosis (M = 3.60, SEM = .06), t (98) = 2.39, p= .02. There was a trend towards a
significant difference in self-reported risk-taking on the ethical domain, in that participants who reported
ever having a mental health diagnosis reported being slightly more likely to take ethical risks (M = 1.99,
SEM = .14) than participants who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 1.71, SEM =
.06), t (98) = 1.96, p = .05. There was also a trend towards a significant difference in the overall
DOSPERT scores, in that participants who reported ever having a mental health diagnosis reported being
slightly more likely to take risks (M = 2.76, SEM = .08) than those who have never received a mental
health diagnosis (M = 2.58, SEM = .05), t (98) = 1.89, p = .07. There was not a significant difference in
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participants’ scores on the financial domain t (98) = -.42, p = .68, or recreational domain t (98) = -.26, p =
.80 for those who have ever had a mental health diagnosis and those who have not.
Two-tailed, independent samples t-tests were used to analyze the difference between self-reported
mental health (in terms of currently having a mental health diagnosis) and self-reported risk-taking
behavior on the DOSPERT (See Figure 8). Participants who reported that they currently have a mental
health diagnosis reported being more likely to take social risks (M = 4.01, SEM = .14) than participants
who did not currently have a mental health diagnosis (M = 3.59, SEM = .06), t (98) = 2.89, p = .005.
There was a trend towards significance in self-reported risk-taking on the health/safety domain, in that
those who reported that they currently have a mental health diagnosis indicated they were slightly more
likely to take health/safety risks (M = 3.01, SEM = .14) than those who do not currently have a mental
health diagnosis (M = 2.70, SEM = .08), t (98) = 1.74, p = .08. There was not a significant difference in
participants’ overall DOSPERT scores t (98) = 1.18, p = .24, or their scores on the ethical domain t (98) =
1.19, p = .24, financial domain t (98) = -.77, p = .44, or recreational domain t (98) = -.48, p = .64 for those
who currently have a mental health diagnosis and those who do not.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis 1: Those induced with positive affect will display higher levels of risk-taking behavior
than those who are induced with negative affect.
Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of this study. It was hypothesized that those
induced with positive affect would rely on System 1 thinking and display higher levels of risk-taking than
those induced with negative affect, who would rely more heavily on System 2 thinking. However, those
induced with negative affect actually displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking than those induced
with positive affect, which was the opposite of the predicted results. However, the difference in the
average number of pumps on the BART (i.e., level of risk-taking) between the two groups was not
statistically significant. Though participants induced with negative affect had a higher average number of
pumps on the BART than participants induced with positive affect, the two groups did not perform
differently enough on the behavioral measure (i.e., the BART) to warrant any significant findings.
The directionality of these results could potentially be explained by the Mood Maintenance
Hypothesis, which suggests that those in a positive mood tend to be more risk-aversive than those in a
negative mood because they want to maintain their good mood, and feel that they have more to lose than
those in a negative mood (Isen & Patrick, 1983). If the affect manipulation was successful in inducing
positive affect, it is possible that participants in the positive affect conditions pumped the balloon less
because the idea of losing points would hurt their positive affective state. Therefore, participants in the
positive affect condition may have been more cautious in an attempt to preserve their good mood. On the
other hand, those in a negative mood tend to be more risk-seeking as an attempt to change their mood
(e.g., winning on a gamble would improve their mood), and because they feel that they have less to lose
than those in a positive mood. If the affect manipulation was effective in inducing negative affect, it is
possible participants in the negative affect conditions were attempting to repair their mood by pumping
the balloon more. By pumping the balloon more, participants had an increased chance of gaining a higher
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amount of points. It is possible that obtaining a high amount of points was perceived as something good
that would improve their mood. On the other hand, pumping the balloon more also lead to an increased
risk of bursting the balloon and losing all the points accumulated on that round. It is possible that the
chance of bursting the balloon and losing points was worth the risk to those in the negative affect
condition because they were already in a negative mood. However, this is stated cautiously because the
difference between the positive affect and negative affect groups was not statistically significant, and
these results cannot be considered in support of the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis. For example, it is
possible that the directionality of the results is simply due to the affect manipulation not producing the
intended results. The PANAS change scores indicated that there was no significant increase in positive
affect for those in the positive affect conditions. If the film clip had been effective in inducing positive
affect, it would have been expected to see an increase in positive affect for these groups. Though there
was a slight reduction in negative affect for those in the positive affect conditions, the difference was not
quite statistically significant. The PANAS change scores indicated that there was no significant increase
in negative affect for those in the negative affect conditions. If the film clip had been effective in inducing
negative affect, it would have been expected to see an increase in negative affect for these groups. If it
cannot be verified that the positive affect group displayed higher levels of positive affect than the negative
affect group and the negative affect group displayed higher levels of negative affect than the positive
affect group, the directionality of the results cannot truly be attributed to affect levels.
Based on these results, participants induced with negative affect most likely did not rely more
heavily on System 2 thinking than those induced with positive affect as was predicted. If they had, the
results should have demonstrated that participants in the negative affect condition were more risk-averse.
However, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of why participants induced with negative affect
were not more risk-averse. The predicted results may not have been found due to the fact that the affect
manipulation did not have the intended effects, or because of an alternate explanation such as the mood
maintenance hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2a: Those in the positive affect with warning messages condition will not differ in levels
of risk-taking behavior from the positive affect with no warning messages condition.
Hypothesis 2a was partially supported by the results, as there was not a significant difference in
risk-taking behavior between the positive affect with warning messages condition and the positive affect
without warning messages condition. However, as there were no significant differences between any of
the four conditions in the study, it cannot truly be concluded that the hypothesis was supported in the way
outlined by the logic of the study. In other words, because no significant effects of the warning messages
were found and no significant changes in affect levels were detected, it cannot be concluded that the
positive affect with warning messages condition and the positive affect without warning messages
condition did not differ in a statistically significant way because positive affect increased reliance on
System 1 thinking and decreased reliance on System 2 thinking. Therefore, though the two conditions did
not differ significantly, it was most likely not due to the predicted interaction effect between positive
affect and warning messages.
In addition, the participants in the positive affect with warning messages condition pumped the
balloon slightly more on average than the participants in the positive affect without warnings messages
condition, though the difference between the groups was not statistically significant. However, it is
interesting that those who received warning messages pumped the balloon slightly more than those who
did not, as the warning messages were intended to reduce risky behavior.
Hypothesis 2b: Those in the negative affect with warning messages condition will display lower
levels of risk-taking than those in all other conditions.
Hypothesis 2b was not supported by the results of this study. It was hypothesized that negative
affect and the warning messages would interact to decrease risk-taking more than in the other three
conditions because negative affect and the warning messages would both increase reliance on System 2
thinking. If participants were relying on System 2 thinking, they should have displayed lower levels of
risk-taking (i.e., they should have pumped the balloon less). Though the difference was not statistically
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significant, participants in both negative affect conditions displayed higher levels of risk-taking than those
in both positive affect conditions. In addition, there was virtually no difference in levels of risk-taking
between the negative affect with warning messages and negative affect without warning messages
conditions.
It is possible that the negative affect manipulation did not produce the intended effects, which
could explain why decreased risk-taking was not seen in those induced with negative affect. The mean
PANAS score for negative affect changed very little from the first to the second PANAS for those in the
negative affect conditions, which indicated that the negative affect film clip may not have been effective.
If participants in the negative affect conditions were not experiencing negative affect as intended, it is
possible that they were not relying on System 2 thinking. This could explain why those in these
conditions exhibited slightly more risk-taking behavior.
In addition, the warning messages produced no change in behavior, in either direction, for those
induced with negative affect. The warning messages followed guidelines laid out by previous research
that should have helped increase their effectiveness- the messages contained information aimed to correct
gambling related cognitive biases, appeared between trials, and required participants to interact with the
message (by pressing “space”) to continue (Ginley et al., 2017). The warning messages should have
caused participants to rely more heavily on System 2 thinking, which should have made them more
cautious and risk-averse than participants who did not receive the warning messages. It was expected that
these messages would help participants recognize flawed thinking (due to cognitive biases), and cause
increased activation of System 2 thinking. Though they were intended to help reduce risky behavior, the
warning messages were ineffective.
PANAS Change Scores
PANAS change scores were calculated for those induced with positive affect and those induced
with negative affect to see if the affect level of each group changed in the intended direction. It was
predicted that those induced with positive affect would have a higher PANAS change score for positive
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affect than those induced with negative affect. The PANAS change scores indicated that those induced
with positive affect reported slightly lower levels of negative affect on the second PANAS, but they also
reported slightly lower levels of positive affect on the second scale. The reduction in negative affect was
greater than the reduction in positive affect; however, neither the PANAS change score for positive affect
or the PANAS change score for negative affect for those induced with positive affect reached statistical
significance. It was also predicted that those induced with negative affect would have a higher PANAS
change score for negative affect than those induced with positive affect. Neither the PANAS change score
for positive affect or the PANAS change score for negative affect for those induced with negative affect
was statistically significant.
Though the scores did change slightly for each group by the second PANAS, the change was not
different enough to warrant any significant findings. The PANAS change scores and the means for each
group from PANAS time 1 and PANAS time 2 suggest that participants either remained around their
baseline affect levels throughout the study, or they returned to their baseline affect levels prior to
completing the second PANAS. This could be due to the affect manipulation not having the intended
effects, the affect manipulation not producing long-lasting effects, or the BART interfering with the
effects of the affect manipulation. For example, the Dead Poet’s Society film clip may not have been
effective in inducing positive affect, which could explain why there was not a significant change in
positive affect for those who viewed this film clip. However, the positive affect conditions did display a
slight reduction in negative affect, which could suggest that the film clip’s effects may simply have worn
off by the time the PANAS was administered for a second time. The effects may have just faded with
time, or it is possible that the BART introduced different emotions that interfered with the effects of the
affect manipulation. It is also possible that the Misery film clip was not effective in inducing negative
affect, which could explain why there was not a significant change in negative affect for those who
viewed this film clip. Once again, it is also possible that the BART interfered with the effects of the affect
manipulation or any effects of the film clip simply faded with time. Unlike with the positive affect

40
conditions and the slight reduction of negative affect (which could potentially indicate the film clip may
have had some of the desired effects), there was no reduction of positive affect for those in the negative
affect conditions.
DOSPERT and BART
The BART has been shown to be correlated with traits of impulsivity and sensation-seeking and
self-reported risk-taking in terms of gambling, substance use (alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs),
unprotected sex, theft, and not wearing a seatbelt (Lejuez et al., 2002). In addition, studies have found that
participants’ score on the DOSPERT was related to their performance on the BART (Lorian & Grisham,
2010; Pietruska & Armony, 2013). However, the current study did not find any correlations between the
BART and the DOSPERT, with the exception of the social domain.
Performance on the BART was negatively related to participants’ score on the DOSPERT social
domain. A higher score on the social domain (i.e., greater self-reported likelihood of engaging in risky
social behaviors) was related to a lower number of average pumps on the BART (i.e., lower levels of risktaking behavior), while a lower score on the social domain was related to a higher number of average
pumps on the BART. Gender could be a potential explanation of this result, as men had a higher average
score on the BART than women, but women had a higher average score on the DOSPERT social domain
than males. Thus, this could possibly explain the negative relationship between the two variables.
Gender
The current study found that men exhibited a higher level of risk-taking behavior than women, as
evidenced by men pumping the balloon more on average than women during the BART trials. This is
consistent with previous literature, which suggests that men often take risks more than women (Byrnes et
al, 1999; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Harris et al, 2006), though this may depend on the type of risk (Byrnes
et al, 1999; Figner & Weber, 2011).
The current study detected significant differences between men and women on the social and
financial domains of the DOSPERT, which has been demonstrated in previous studies as well (Figner &

41
Weber, 2011; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2013). Men indicated that they would be more likely to
take financial risks than women. This relates to existing research which has demonstrated that men were
more likely to take financial risks than women (Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Xie et al, 2017). Men have
shown that they perceive financial risks as less risky than women, which potentially explains why men
are more likely to take financial risks (Figner & Weber, 2011). This result is also consistent with the
finding that men displayed higher levels of risk-taking than women on the BART in the current study. On
the other hand, women indicated that they were more likely to engage in social risks. Women have
demonstrated that they view social risks as less risky than men, which potentially explains why women
are more willing to engage in this type of risky behavior (Figner & Weber, 2011). Byrnes et al (1999)
conducted a meta-analysis that found that gender differences in risk-taking often vary by context,
meaning that men may be more likely to take risks than women in certain contexts/situations and women
may be more likely to take risks than men in other contexts/situations than males. In their meta-analysis,
men were more likely to take gambling risks than women, which is in line with men having an increased
score on the DOSPERT financial domain in the current study.
Mental Health
Participants who indicated that they have, at some point in their life, been given a mental health
diagnosis had higher scores on the DOSPERT health/safety domain. Therefore, these participants
indicated that they would be more likely to engage in behaviors that pose a risk to their health and/or
safety than participants who indicated that they have not ever been given a mental health diagnosis.
Individuals who had been given a mental health diagnosis at some point in their life were found to be
more likely to smoke cigarettes than individuals who had never received a mental health diagnosis
(Lasser, Boyd, Woolhandler, Himmelstein, McCormick, & Bor, 2000). In addition, a diagnosis of ADHD
has shown to be related to higher levels of substance abuse (Lee, Humphreys, Flory, Liu, & Glass, 2011)
and risky sexual behavior (Sarver, McCart, Sheidow, & Letourneau, 2014), while a diagnosis of
depression has been shown to be related to a poorer quality diet (Appelhans et al., 2012) and a higher
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likelihood of not adhering to medical treatment (DiMatteo, Lepper, & Croghan, 2000). These behaviors
all fall under the health/safety risk category. However, participants were only asked whether they had
ever been given a mental health diagnosis and were not asked to specify and/or elaborate on their
diagnoses in the current study.
Participants who have ever been given a mental health diagnosis also had higher score on the
DOSPERT social domain, meaning that these participants indicated they would be more likely to engage
in social risks than those who have never been given a mental health diagnosis. However, it should be
pointed out that in the current study, only a small number of participants reported ever having a mental
health diagnosis, and the majority of those participants were female. Therefore, it is possible that the
reason ever having a mental health diagnosis was related to a higher likelihood of engaging in social risks
was because the majority of participants in that particular analysis were female. As demonstrated when
gender was analyzed, females indicated that they were more likely to engage in social risks than males.
This could also be the reason that those who currently have a mental health diagnosis also had a higher
score on the DOSPERT social domain than those who do not currently have a mental health diagnosis.
Once again, only a small number of participants fell into this category, and the majority of them were
female.
General Discussion
Affect did not significantly affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that positive affect would
lead to increased level of risk-taking; however, this effect was not observed. It is possible that the positive
affect manipulation was not strong enough to place the participants in a state of cognitive ease, which
should have increased their reliance on System 1 thinking. System 1 thinking is fast, intuitive, and
requires very little cognitive effort. As such, System 1 thinking can be prone to errors and cognitive
biases. When relying on System 1 thinking, risky behavior is often increased. Therefore, if participants
induced with positive affect were relying on System 1 thinking, they should have demonstrated higher
levels of risk-taking than those induced with negative affect. Negative affect was expected to decrease
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risky behavior; however, this was not observed either. It is possible that the negative affect manipulation
was not strong enough to place the participants in a state of cognitive strain, which should have increased
reliance on System 2 thinking. System 2 is slow, deliberative, and requires cognitive effort. As such,
System 2 is much less prone to errors than System 1, and System 2 is often associated with less risktaking behavior. If participants induced with negative affect were relying on System 2 thinking, they
should have exhibited lower levels of risk-taking behavior than those induced with negative affect.
However, participants induced with negative affect displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking than
those induced with positive affect, though the difference was not statistically significant. It is not possible
to attribute the slight increase in risk-taking behavior to negative affect, as the effects of the affect
manipulation were unable to be verified.
Warning messages did not significantly affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that
participants who received warning messages would display lower levels of risk-taking than participants
who did not receive warning messages. It is common to experience cognitive biases (e.g., illusion of
control, gambler’s fallacy), which stem from System 1, when gambling. It was expected that displaying
warning messages aimed to correct those cognitive biases would help increase reliance on System 2
thinking, which would in turn cause participants to be more cautious and take less risks. However, this
was not the case as warning messages were not effective at reducing risky behavior. Participants who
received warning messages most likely did not rely more heavily on System 2 thinking than those who
did not receive warning messages.
Affect and warning messages did not interact to affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that
participants in the positive affect with warning messages condition would not differ significantly in terms
of risk-taking behavior from those in the positive affect without warning messages condition. While the
two groups technically did not differ in levels of risk-taking, it cannot be verified that the reason they did
not differ was due to an interaction between affect and warning messages. It was hypothesized that the
two groups would not differ significantly on levels of risk-taking behavior because the effects of the
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positive affect manipulation would overpower the effects of the warning messages. In other words, it was
expected that the feelings of positive affect would cause an increased reliance on System 1 thinking for
participants in both conditions. Due to the increased reliance on System 1 from the positive affect and the
fact that System 2 has limited resources and often chooses to preserve those resources, the warning
messages would not be effective at activating System 2 thinking. As warning messages did not have an
effect on risk-taking behavior in any condition and the effects of the affect manipulation cannot be
verified, it is likely that these results do not support the expected interaction effect. It should be noted that
those in the positive affect with warning messages displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking on the
BART than those in the positive affect without warning messages condition, though the difference was
not statistically significant.
It was also expected that an interaction effect would be observed between negative affect and
warning messages. Negative affect was expected to increase reliance on System 2 thinking and thus
decrease risk-taking behavior, and warning messages were also expected to decrease risk-taking behavior.
Therefore, it was hypothesized that those in the negative affect with warning messages condition would
display the lowest levels of risk-taking compared to the other conditions. However, group mean BART
score for the negative affect with warning messages condition and the negative affect without warnings
messages condition was almost the same. This indicates that the warning messages did not have an effect
on participants’ risk-taking behavior. In addition, both negative affect conditions had slightly higher
scores on the BART than the positive affect conditions. Therefore, it is likely that neither the negative
affect or the warning messages caused participants in the negative affect with warning messages condition
to rely more heavily on System 2 thinking. If participants relied on System 2 thinking, lower levels of
risk-taking should have been observed.
As the effects of the affect manipulation cannot be verified, it cannot be concluded whether affect
has an effect on gambling warning messages. Therefore, future research in this area may still be
necessary. It is not possible to determine why the hypotheses were not supported. It is possible the affect
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manipulation was not effective, the effects of the affect manipulation did not last long enough, or the
BART interfered with the effects of the affect manipulation. It is also possible that the hypotheses were
not supported due to an alternate explanation, such as the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis. Future research
would want to verify that the affect manipulation had the intended effect in order to rule out any alternate
explanations. In addition, the warning messages were not effective. This may suggest that further research
should be conducted to attempt to increase the effectiveness of gambling warning messages for various
populations and across various settings.
Limitations and Future Directions
Affect Manipulation. Though the film clips used in this study have been shown to be effective for
inducing positive and negative affect in other studies (Elices et al., 2012; Gartner & Bajbouj, 2014;
Hinojosaa et al., 2017; Karsdorp et al., 2012; Lalot et al., 2014; Rennung & Gõritz, 2015; Schaefer et al.,
2010), no change in affect levels were detected in the current study. There are many potential reasons for
why the affect manipulation was not effective in this study.
Both film clips targeted specific positive or negative emotions. The Misery film clip targeted fear,
while the Dead Poet’s Society film clip targeted tenderness (Schaefer et al., 2010). Perhaps future
research could try to use film clips that target more general feelings of positive and negative affect,
instead of film clips that target specific emotions.
In addition, it is possible the chosen film clips were not sufficient to produce the intended effects
for the particular participants in the study. For instance, during the debriefing four participants indicated
that they enjoyed watching the Misery film clip, and two participants indicated that they found the film
clip to be funny. Though only a small number of participants explicitly stated that they found the film
enjoyable or funny, enjoyment and amusement were certainly not the intended effects of the film.
In the Misery film clip, a female character is preparing to use a sledgehammer break the ankles of
a man she is holding hostage. The decision was made to cut the film clip off as the woman prepares to
swing the sledgehammer, but before she actually breaks his ankles. While this part of the film clip was
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included in previous studies that successfully used the clip, it was not used in the current study due to
concerns that the ankle breaking scene would be too upsetting for participants. Therefore, in an attempt to
minimize harm to participants, that part of the film was not shown. However, perhaps the film clip would
have been more effective in inducing negative affect if the entire film clip was played. It is possible that
viewing the ankle breaking part of the film clip contributed to the feelings of negative affect that were
found in previous studies.
It is also possible that the effect of the affect manipulation simply wore off by the time
participants took the PANAS for the second time. Perhaps the study could have benefited from placing
the PANAS immediately after the film clip to verify whether or not the intended affect was induced.
However, as previously addressed, placing the PANAS after the film clip would have presented other
concerns (e.g., fatigue after completing the PANAS three times, effects wearing off before participants
started the BART).
The BART itself could have potentially influenced participant’s mood. During the debriefing,
seven participants indicated that the BART was boring, and four participants found the BART to be
stressful and/or frustrating. It is possible that the BART could have mitigated any affective effects of the
movie clips, which could potentially explain why participants essentially returned to baseline affect levels
by the time they completed the second PANAS scale.
The last potential limitation for the affect manipulation could be that participants were possibly
given too much information about the study prior to the study’s completion. For example, the study’s title
was listed on the Georgia Southern SONA system, which participants used to sign up for the study, as
“Induced Moods, Warning Messages, and Gambling Behavior.” While the title does not imply any
directionality as far as the hypotheses, it certainly gives the main gist of the experiment away. In addition,
the same study name was listed on the informed consent document. It is very possible that participants
knew coming into the study to expect an attempt to change their mood.
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Warning Messages. The warning messages were also not effective in this study. It is possible that
the messages were not salient enough. Though the messages appeared on a bright red stop sign in the
middle of the feedback screen, it is possible that was not enough to capture participants’ attention.
Perhaps it would have been more effective if the warning messages took up a larger portion of the screen
to make them even more noticeable.
It is also possible that participants realized after the first warning message that they just needed to
press “space” to continue. If this was the case, it is possible that participants were not actually attending to
the messages, and simply pressing “space” to move on. The study was designed to have participants press
“space” to ensure they were given enough time to read the message, and so participants who read faster
did not have to wait for a long period between trials. However, perhaps future research could benefit from
displaying the warning messages for a set duration.
As the BART was only thirty trials, and the warning messages were set to appear every five trials,
participants were only exposed to five warning messages throughout the study. In addition, participants
only saw each message once. There is a possibility that participants were simply not given enough
exposure to the warning messages for them to effectively alter behavior. Previous research has
demonstrated that warning messages need to appear between trials to be effective (Ginley et al., 2017),
but has not focused on whether a certain frequency of warning messages is most effective. Future
research could focus on testing different frequencies of warning messages to determine if this influences
the effectiveness of the messages.
It could also be possible that certain warning messages may have been more effective in reducing
gambling behavior than others. If participants saw the same warning message every five trials, perhaps
the increased repetition and exposure to the same message could have made it more effective. In addition,
if the same message was used each trial it could be determined whether that particular message was
effective in reducing risky behavior or not. The current study was modeled after previous studies which
used different warning messages effectively (Floyd et al., 2006; Jardin & Wulfert, 2009; Jardin &
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Wulfert, 2012). However, perhaps future research could benefit from testing one specific message at a
time to determine which warning messages are effective and which ones are not. Then researchers could
use the warning messages that were demonstrated to be effective in reducing gambling behavior in future
research.
The last potential limitation for the warning messages could be the chosen behavioral measure,
the BART. Though the participants had a chance to win or lose points during the task, there was no
monetary value associated with the points. Participants therefore may not have felt like that had much to
win or lose during the task. The BART was chosen because it is a validated measure of risk-taking
behavior and performance on the BART has been shown to be positively correlated with self-reported
gambling behavior (Wallsten et al., 2005). However, there was not a significant correlation found
between performance on the BART and self-reported financial risk-taking in the current study. Therefore,
it is possible the BART was not the best measure of gambling behavior for the current sample.
Sampling Issues. It is possible that the current sample size was not large enough to detect any
significant effects. The current sample size allowed for twenty-five participants per condition. Some
researchers argue that a minimum of fifty participants per condition is necessary to detect significant
effects (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013). However, the current sample size was selected based on
a power analysis conducted prior to data collection, which concluded that a minimum of sixty-six
participants should have been enough to detect any significant effects. In addition, data collection for this
study occurred at the end of the spring semester. It is possible that not all participants gave their full
attention to the study due to the end of the semester approaching. Therefore, the current sample of
undergraduate students may not have been ideal for detecting the effects of this study. In addition, future
research may benefit from using a sample of current gamblers to test these effects.
In conclusion, more research needs to be conducted to conclude if gambling warning messages
are a viable option for reducing gambling behavior. Future research should attempt to identify an effective
set of warning messages and determine if the frequency of warning messages influences their
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effectiveness. It may be beneficial to examine these effects on a population of current gamblers. In
addition, future research should continue to examine warning messages in the context of positive and
negative affect. Future researchers should ensure they can effectively induce participants with positive or
negative affect, and that the effects of the affect manipulation last long enough for participants to
complete the study. Exploring these avenues will help strengthen the literature on gambling warning
messages and determine if a case can be made for implementing mandatory warning messages in
gambling venues.
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Table 1
Demographic Information

Mean
Age
Gender
Men
Women

19.47
Frequency
41
59

Ever given a mental health diagnosis
Yes
No

21
79

Currently have a mental health diagnosis
Yes
No

17
83
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Table 2
PANAS Score Information
Mean

Std. Error of the Mean

3.23
3.31

.08
.10

1.91
1.74

.11
.09

3.17
3.23

.10
.11

1.69
1.69

.10
.10

-.05
-.08

.07
.09

-.22
-.05

.06
.08

PANAS Time 1 Score- Positive
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
PANAS Time 1 Score- Negative
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
PANAS Time 2 Score- Positive
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
PANAS Time 2 Score- Negative
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
PANAS Change Score- Positive
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
PANAS Change Score- Negative
Positive Affect Condition
Negative Affect Condition
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Table 3
DOSPERT Correlations with Age and the BART

Age

BART

Age

BART

Ethical

Financial

Health/Safety

Recreational

Social

Overall

1

-.005

-.111

-.175

-.055

-.053

.061

-.111

-.005

1

-.083

-.020

-.116

.013

-.219*

-.120

Note. * = significant correlation
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Figure 1. Flowchart representing the procedure of the study.
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Figure 2. Visual representation of the BART trials. (A) depicts the BART trials. (B) shows the negative
feedback screen, which appeared after trials in which the participant popped the balloon. (C) shows the
positive feedback screen, which appeared after trials in which the participant stopped pumping the
balloon and collected their points. (D) depicts the feedback screen with a warning message for those in
the warning messages conditions.
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Figure 3. Visual representation of the average number of pumps on the BART and standard errors for
each of the four conditions: positive affect with warning messages, positive affect without warning
messages, negative affect with warning messages, and negative affect without warning messages.
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Figure 4. Visual representation of the negative correlational relationship between average number of
pumps on the BART and the DOSPERT social domain. Note. Pearson’s r = -.22
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Difference in Risk-Taking Behavior by Gender
Average Number of Pumps

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Men

Women
Gender

Figure 5. Visual representation of the means and standard deviations of performance on the BART based
on gender.
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Men

Women

4.5
4

DOSPERT Score

3.5
3
2.5
2

1.5
1
0.5
0
Ethical

Financial

Health
Recreational
DOSPERT Domain

Social

Overall

Figure 6. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains
based on gender.
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Figure 7. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains
based on whether one has ever received a mental health diagnosis.
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Figure 8. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains
based on whether one currently has a mental health diagnosis.
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APPENDIX A
The following scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then select the number that corresponds with the choice that best describes how you are
feeling right now. That is, indicate to what extent you currently feel this way. Remember, there are no
right or wrong answers so please give us your honest opinion.
Interested
1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Distressed

Excited

Upset

Strong

Guilty

Scared

Hostile
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Enthusiastic
1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Proud

Irritable

Alert

Ashamed

Inspired

Nervous

Determined

Attentive

Jittery
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Active
1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

1
Very slightly
or not at all

2
A little

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Afraid
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APPENDIX B
You will now read statements describing a variety of behaviors. Read each item and then select the
number that corresponds with how likely it is that you would engage in that behavior. Remember, there
are no right or wrong answers so please give us your honest opinion.

Admitting that your tastes are different from those of your friends. (S)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground. (R)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Buying an illegal drug for your own use. (H)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Cheating on an exam. (E)
1
Very unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. (R)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. (H)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. (E)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Disagreeing with your father on a major issue. (S)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

2
Unlikely
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Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game. (F)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Having an affair with a married man or woman. (E)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Forging somebody’s signature. (E)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel accommodations. (R)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion. (S)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. (R)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Approaching your boss to ask for a raise. (S)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Illegally copying a piece of software. (E)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. (R)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g., baseball, soccer, or football). (F)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
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Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you. (S)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock. (F)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Shoplifting a small item (e.g., a lipstick or a pen). (E)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion. (S)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Engaging in unprotected sex. (H)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for. (E)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat. (H)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

3
Not sure

Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (e.g., treasury bills). (F)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky diving). (R)
1
2
3
4
5
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely
Very Likely
Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle. (H)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (F)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

3
Not sure

Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable. (S)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely
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Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion. (S)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. (H)
1
2
3
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Trying out bungee jumping at least once. (R)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Piloting your own small plane, if you could. (R)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

5
Very Likely

Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town. (H)
1
2
3
4
Very unlikely
Unlikely
Not sure
Likely

5
Very Likely

Regularly eating high cholesterol foods. (H)
1
2
Very unlikely
Unlikely

5
Very Likely

3
Not sure

4
Likely

*H= health/safety domain, S= social domain, F= financial domain, R= recreational domain, E= ethical
domain
**Domain abbreviations were not presented to participants during the study.

